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AUTHOR'S NOTE
The present work is a revised version of my previous
Technical Memorandum (TM), "Information Theory and the
Earth's Density Distribution," NASA TP.1-73088, dated
February 1978. There are three reasons for publishing
this revision.
First, I included a discussion of Rietsch (1977).
I was unaware of his important pioneering paper until I
was kindly advised of it by the editor and referees of
the Geophysical Journal.
Second, I expanded the discussion of certain points
(such as the nature of probability) which were only briefly
mentioned in the original TM.
Third and last, I presented the new material on
Shannon's information measure for continuous probability
distributions.
These reasons, I feel, are more than sufficient for
producing a revision of the earlier work.
v
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rINFORMATION THEORY AND THE EARTH'S
DENSITY DISTRIBUTION
David Parry Rubincam
NAS-NRC Resident Research Associate
ABSTRACT
The "most likely" density distribution inside the
earth is derived from Jaynes's (1957) information theory
approach. The earth is assumed to be spherical and the
density distribution spherically symmetric. The known
mass and moment of inertia are used as constraints on the
density distribution. The partitioning of particles among
cubical boxes and use of the grand canonical ensemble from
statistical mechanics result in a density distribution of
the form p(r) = 12.30 exp(-1.46r 2 /a2 )g/cm3 where aE is
the radius of the earth. This differs from the density
distribution derived by Rietsch (1977), who also used
the information theory approach. The difference results
from Rietsch allowing the density to vary continuously
inside the volume elements rather than in discrete steps
as done here. Some criticisms of information theory
inference are discussed. In particular, Shannon's (1948)
generalization of the information measure to continuous
probability distributions is defended as the more useful
measure in the continuous case over the Kullback measure.
Future directions for information theory inference in solid
earth geophysics are indicated.
vii
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INFORMATION THEORY AND THE EARTH'S
DENSITY DISTRIBUTION
1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, Rietsch (1977) introduced Jaynes's (1957)
information theory approach to inverse problems in solid earth
geophysics. The information theory approach is a method of scien-•
tific inference which has had great success in statistical me-
chanics (see e.g., Jaynes 1957, 1963; Tribus 1961; I:atz 1. 0.67; and
Baierlein 1971) and in spectral analysis (e.g., Burg 1967, 1968,
1972; Smylie et al. 1973; and Graber 1976). Rietsch (1977)
applied the approach to two problems. The first. problem dealt with
spectral analysis; I will not discuss it at all here. The second
dealt with inferring the density distribution for the earth from
knowledge of its mass and moment of inertia; the earth is assumed
to be spherical and the density distribution spherically symmetric.
I have also applied information theory inference to the very
same problem of the earth's density distribution. My approach,
however, is somewhat different from Rietsch's (1977), and conse-
quently so is the density distribution. In this paper I present
these results together with a discussion of the differences be-
tween the two approaches, and some general comments on information
theory not discussed by Rietsch (1977).
2. THE INFERENCE PROBLEM
This is the nature of the problem: we desire to know what
the density distribution p(r) is as a function of radial distancE
r from the center of the earth, but the only information we have
1
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about the earth is its mass ME and moment of inertia CE, both of
which depend upon p(r). Clearly we do not have enough informa-
tion to say what p(r) actually is. Any proposed distribution
which satisfies the mass and moment of inertia is nonunique;
there are infinitely many other distributions which also satisfy
the given data. Bence we raniic . ,; i nvert the data; we must infer
an answer from incom.p lete data.
There are several methods for dealing with this problem.
(For a general discussion see Bullen 1975, pp. 60-64.) The ap-
proach of Backus and Gilbert (1967, 1968) is to study all solu-
tions consistent with the given data; this is called the geophys-
ical inverse problem. The Backus-Gilbert approach has been used
extensively. See, for example, Gilbert et al. (1973); Parker
(1977a, 1977b); Jordan and Franklin (1971); and references cited
by Parker (1977a, 1977b), Richards (1975), Anderson (1975), and
Engdahl et al. (1975). A quite different method is that of Press
(1968a, 1968b), who adopted a Monte Carlo technique of testing a
wide range of models against the data and retaining only those
which agreed with it. However, the commonest method by far is
that of modeling: By introducing certain assumptions in addition
to the data, the answer becomes unique. The assumptions of the
Adams-Williamson equation and uniform chemical composition, for
instance, plus the known mass, seismic velocities, and surface
density determine a unique density distribution (Alterman et al.
1959, pp. 80-81). Of course a difficulty with modeling is that
the assumed conditions may not hold.
Information theory inference approaches the problem from the
followir- viewpoint: We cannot reject any possible answer. (in
6
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our case, density distribution) which agrees with the known data.
We do feel, however, that some answers are more likely than others.
So we do the following: Assign each possible answer a probability
that it is the correct answer, then apportion the magnitudes of the
probabilities in accordance with the data we have on hand. For
this purpose we need to define the word "probability".
3. PROBABILITY
There are two major schools of thought on the nature of
probability (Howard 1968, pp. 211-212). Presently, the majority
of probability theory users hold that a probability is an objec-
tive quantity. A coin, for example, has a certain probability
of falling hea-'- just as it has mass and angular velocity. The
way to measure he probability is to flip the coin a large number
of times and note the frequency of occurrence of heads.
While this is the traditional view of probability, it has
the requirement of repeatability. If, for example, we discuss the
probability of a successful launching of the next space station,
then the objective view is of no use. The next launching is a
one-of-a-kind affair, unlike the flip of a coin. The same is true
of our topic: There is only one earth with one density distribu-
tion. There is no "ensemble of earths"!
This difficulty leads to the second, more powerful view of
probability: Subjective probability, used in information theory
inference and decision theory. The subjective view holds that a
probability reflects our state of knowledge about phenomena,
rather than about the phenomena themselves (Howard 1368, p. 211).
!	 i
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v;e would assign equal probabilities for a coin falling heads or
tails, for instance, if we have no information which would cause
us to prefer one outcome over the other. Hence a probability
represents our "degree of rational belief" (Baierl.ein 1971, p. 13)
that a particular outcome will occur. It need not be repeatable.
The probabilities are subjective in the sense: that they depend
on a state of knowledge, and one person's data. may differ from
another's.
The subjective view of probability has been around for quite
some time. It was held by Bayes and Laplace, and quantitative
treatments have been given by John Maynard Keynes, Harold Jeffreys,
John G. Kemeny, and Rudolf Carnap (Cox 1961), It was not until
recently, however, that this view has gained many adherents. One
reason for this situation is that it ran counter to the prevailing
dogma of the objective view, as discussed by Jaynes (1.967).
Another reason was the lack of a cogent set of axioms from the
subjective probability theorists from which to derive the probabil-
ity calculus. This defect was remedied by Cox (1946, 1961), whose
axioms are so simple yet compelling that they lead to the usual
laws of probability without the introduction of ensembles or fre-
quencies. This, plus the introduction of information theory by
Shannon (1948), has caused the numbers of subjectivists to wax
and objectivists to wane (Howard 1968, p. 212).
The probability calculus alone does not tell us how to as-
sign probabilities; it only gives us rules for operating with
them. What we need is a way of computing magnitudes of probabil-
ities consistent with given data. This is where Jaynes's (1957)
4
information theory approach comes in. (Baierlein 1971 has an
excellent general discussion of the information theory approach.)
4. JAYNES'S PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM PREJUDICE
4.1 SHANNON'S INFORMATION MEASURE
At the heart of the approach is Shannon's (1948) information
measure
N
Nfli (Pi ,P2 .... PN)
	
-KZ PilnPi
	 (4.1)i=1
Here P i
 is the probability that the ith of N possible answers is
the correct answer and K is a positive constant. This function
was originally termed the entropy function (Tribus and McIrvine
1970, p. 180), due to its similarity to thermodynamic entropy.
For this reason the information theory approach is often called
the Maximum Entropy Method, or MEM for short. The relationship
between the information measure and thermodynamic entropy is deep,
but the two are not identical (Baierlein 1971, pp. 473-478). To
avoid confusion I will follow Baierlein (1971, p. 64) and call
Shannon's information measure MI (P l , P2,---,PN), where MI stands
for Missing Information, or the amount of information needed to
determine which answer is correct. A 'utter term for the approach
would be ITI, or Information Theory Inference, rather than MEM.
MI is not dimensionless (Edmundson, private communication,
1976), a fact that does not appear to be explicitly noted by Katz
(1967) or Baierlein (1971). It carries units of information. For
example, if we change the base of the logarithm in (4.1) from e
r
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to 2, which changes K to a new constant V. <4nd set K' = 1, then
MI = -EP i log2P i
 and MI is measured in bits. In the following
development I will retain the natural logarithm base and set K = 1,
so that ASI is measured in nats (from natural digits; McEliece
1977, p. 15). I will also suppress the units but it should be
remembered that MI is not a dimensionless quantity.
The importance of the MI function is its uniqueness; that is,
given certain very reasonable assumptions of how the MI function
should behave, one is inevitably led to (4.1). In this respect it
is like Cox's (1946, 1961) derivation of the probability calculus.
I will not state the assumptions or prove that they lead to
MI. The assumptions are givers by Rietsch (1977, p. 491), and
proofs are supplied by Shannon (19 .18, pp. 419-420) and Baierlein
(1971, pp. 64-74). Rather, I will merely indicate its plausibility
with an example. But first we note from (4.1) that MI> 0; the
amount of information needed to single out the correct answer is
never negative, This is certainly an intuitively desirable
property. Now let us suppose that all of the probabilities are
equal. In this case it can be shown that AZI attains its maximum
value. This accords with intuition: we are surely in a state of
maximum ignorance (i.e., need the most information) if we can
favor no answer above another in terms of probability. Suppose
now we have discovered that the jth po,ssibilii,y is the correct
answer. Then P  = 1 and P i
 = 0 for i^,j. How much information is
missing now? In this caso P j In P j = 1 In 1 = 0, and P i ln P i = 0
for i ;d j (by vir--` e of lim xln x = 0) . Thus MI = 0; no informa-
x- 0
tion is missing; we have the answer. This also accords with
6
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intuition. Normully our ignorance lies between these two extremes,
and MI takes on .alues accordingly between its maximum and 0.
Hence MI is a plausible measure of missing information.
4.2 JAYNES'S PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM PREJUDICE
The essence of the information theory approach is this:
choose the probabilities P1,P2,...,PN of the possible outcomes
to make MI as large Rs possible, subject to the constraints of
the known data. This is Jaynes's principle of minimum prejudice
('17ribus and Rossi 1973). The information theory approach is there-
fore rational method for assigning probabilities. In statistical
mechanics, this procedure is equivalent to maximizing the entropy
(Morse 1969).
To illustrat-e the technique with an example, suppose that
we do not know the mass of the earth exactly, but do know that it
must be chosen from the values M 1 , M2) ... ,MN. Aside from Z" P i = 1,
this is all we know. We must find Pj , the probability that Mj
 is
the correct mass, by maximizing MI. This is done by taking the
partial derivative of
N	 N
-E PilnPi + 
a0 F Piii=1	 =1
with respect to each P i
 and setting it equal to zero. The a 0 is
a Lagrange multiplier which ensures that all of the probabilities
add up to 1. Carrying out the process yields
-InP.3 - 1 + a0 = 0
or
Pi = ea0-1 = constant
7
unknown ao may be found from the constraint
N
E P. = 1
i=1 1
givirig
Pi = 1/N
All of the; probabilities are equal. We knot, nothing about the
various Mi and therefore cannot favor one particular value over
another.
Now suppose wo obtain furthor information: e.g., we learn
that the expectation value of the mass is
N
E P i 'M i = Al 
i=1
We than reassign probabili ties in accordance with .Jaynes's
principle:
c[-EP ilnP i + a0 EP i + a 1 F.P iM i l = 0	 i = 1,2,...N
-5-Pi
giving an exponential function in Ali:
P	
eao-ie(VIIIii
where ao and a  are Lagrange multipliers to be found from the eoa-
straints
1, EP i M = Mr
Note that our method is completely analogous to that of the can-
onical ensemble in statistical mechanics (Morse 1969, pp. 268-269).
8
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Indeed, the mathematics is identical. The only difference is in
the philosophical basis, which indicates that the method has broad
applicability and is not confined to statistical mechanics
(Jaynes 1963, P. 192).
Maximizing the MI function is obviously the key point in the
information theory approach; it provides us with the magnitudes
of the probabilities. Hence justification for this approach is
necessary.
The justification Does 'like this: MI is the unique measure
for determining the amount of information needed to single out
the correct answer. Any method for assigning probabilities which
does not maximize MI under known constraints (knowledge) tacitly
assumes information it hasn't got! In other words, if someone
assigns probabilities not in accordance with Jaynes's principle,
that person is prejudicing the probabilities without foundation
in the known data. Thus is derived the name, "principle of
minimum prejudice".
This poLa t is particularly clear in our last example, where
we knew one of the M i was the correct answer for the mass of the
earth, but had no other information (other than T P i = 1). In this
case, Jaynes's principle assigned equal probabilities to all out-
comes. We were completely ignorant as to which answer was cor-
rect. If someone used some other principle, and assigned, for
example, a larger probability to M 1 than to the other M i , we can
legitimately ask, "You favored M1 as being the most likely mass
over all of the others. What basis (i.e., information) do you
have for doing that?"
9
The user of some other principle or function also runs the
risk of being inconsistent (Jaynes 1957, p. 623; Rietsch 1977,
p. 493). Hence minimum prejudice, plus consistency, give the
function MI a powerful claim to being the proper choice.
5. INFORMATION THEORY DENSITY DISTRIBUTION
I now present my own development of the information theory
density distribution, and afterwards compare it to Rietsch's
(1977). I will make heavy use of the methods of statistical
mechanics; particularly that of the grand canonical ensemble
(Morse 1969, pp. 316-327).
Imagine a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system with
its origin at the center of the earth. The grid system will
divide up the earth into many cubes of identical volumes
V = dx•dy • dz, just as ordinary graph paper divides up a plane into
squares of equal area. We can approximate the spherical surface
of the earth as closely as we like by making the cubes as small
as we like, Let r j be the vector from the center of the earth to
the jth cube and set Irj l = rj . Let the mass of the earth be the
sum of the masses of a large number of indistinguishable particles,
each with mass m. The particles are distributed amongst the cubes,
with nj particles occupying the jth cube. The mass ME
 and moment
of inertia CE of the earth are then
ME = Enjm	 (5.1)
j
CE ` (2J3)Jnjmrj2
10
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where the subscript j runs over all of the cubes comprising the
earth. The factor (2/3) appearing in the second equation makes
use of the assumption that the density distribution is spherically
symmetric, and takes care of rj
 being the distance from the center
of the earth to a cube and not the distance to some axis of ro-
tation. This factor may be verified by taking the cubes to be so
small that we can switch from summations to integrals without
serious error, and then integrate over latitude and longitude.
Let me remark here that we have chosen cubes of equal volume
so as to treat all regions of the earth identically. We have also
chosen indistinguishable particles because the interchanging of
particles leaves the density distribution unaffected. In other
words, the only information needed to characterize the density
distribution is to know the number of particles in each cube, and
not to know which particular particle is in which cube. We make
no commitment as to the values of m and V. As we shall see, they
drop out of the final equation for the density distribution. These
assumptions will be further discussed later on.
Our problem is the following. A possible model for the earth
is one which has n 1 particles in cube 1, n 2
 particles in cube 2,
and so on. Each possible model will be given the subscript i, so
that Mi and Ci are the mass and moment of inertia, respectively,
for the ith model. 'Ne place no restrictions on the number of
particles allowed to occupy each cube, so there are an infinite
number of models. Our task is to assign each possible model a
probability P i that it is the correct model. Our information will
^ P
	 11
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Vbe that the expectation values of the mass E P iMi and moment of
inertia EPiC i are known to be ME and CE , respectively. In prac-
tice, ME and CE are the experimentally determined values. Ulti-
mately we will average over all of the models and find n j , the
expectation value for the number of particles in the jth cube.
From this we can determine the "most likely" density distribution.
The probabilities are computed according to Jaynes's prin-
ciple of minimum prejudice:
0[-EP i 1npi  + a0 EP i + a1 EP iMi + a2 EP i_C i ) = 0
8Pi
giving:
ea1Mi + a'2Ci
P =
1	 Z
where
Z = el-'O = Eea1Mi + a2Ci (5.2)
i
From (5.1) we can write
Mi = Enji
m	 ^
(5.3)
3C i
 = En..r•2
m	 j J 1 J
where nji is the number of particles in the jtb cube according to
the ith model. The problem now looks exactly like that of the
grand canonical ensemble in statistical mechanics, with n ji playing
the role of occupation numbers, r j 2 the energy levels, and (5.2)
12
the grand partition function, the equations analogous to (5.3)
being
N = Enj
E = Enjej
The treatment of this problem may be found in any standard sta-
tistical mechanics text. I will follow Morse (1969, p. 326).
Using (5.3) in (5.2) we have
a En.. + a En..r 2
Z = Ee 1 ^i	 2 ji	 (5.4)
i
where we have redefined « lm as a l and (2/3)a2m as a2 . Note that
81nZ = E(Enji ) ealinji + a2injirj
2
8a 1 	i	
Z
E En
	ea
j n]1 + 
a2in..r.	
= En ..P.	 = En.	 (.5.5)
i ji	 ^l 1	 ^
Z	 i
a result that we will make use of shortly.
Let us now rewrite (5.4) as a summation over the possible
values of nj instead of over i. Since there are no limits on the
possible number of particles occupying each cube, we obviously
have
Z =o (al + a2r12) nl . Ee («1 + a2r22) n2.. .
n1=0	 n2=0 (5.6)
= Z1dZ2...
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where
1
Z,	 1 - eal + a 22r
by virtue of
1
= E xn
1 - x n=0
so that Z separates into factors for each cube.
From (5.5) and (5.6) we have
alnZ =
	
1	
=nEn.aa1	
^ -a -a r2	 >
e 1	 2	 - 1
where evidently
_	 1
nj -
	
	 (5.7)
-a1 -a 2r^ - 1
e
Equation (5.7) is identical to the equation for the average number
of particles in an energy state, assuming the particles follow
Bose-Einstein statistics (Morse 1969, p. 326). This is hardly
surprising, since the assumptions regarding the particles are the
same: indistinguishability, plus no limits on the number of
particles occupying a given state.
Let us now make an assumption regarding (5.7) which is well-
founded in classical physics (Morse 1969, p. 325): we assume
that the cubes with volume V may be taken so small that the cubes
14
are sparsely occupied by the particles, thus making the average
number of particles in any given cube a small number compared to
1. This is equivalent to assuming the particles follow Maxwell-
Boltzmann statistics (Morse 1969, p. 324), and (5.7) becomes
nj =	 1	 « 1
e-al 
-a 2r 3 - 1
so that
-al	
2-a r2j	 >> 1
e
and
2
nj	 ealea2rj
The density distribution is obviously
P( r j) = V el l ea2 r j 2
By the assumption of spherical symmetry for the density
distribution we can drop the subscript j and write
P (r) = P (0) ea2r
2	 (5.8)
which we take as the desired information theory density distribu-
tion. The two constants p(0) = V ea t and a 2
 may be found from our
15
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knowledge of the expectation value for the mass and moment of
inertia:
aE
ME = 47 f0 T(r)r 2 dr  = 5.976 x 1027 g
CE = 3
	
p (r) r 4dr	 8.068 x 10 44 g • cm 
fo
where a E is the radius of the earth and our numerical values have
come from Stacey (1969, p. 279). W( ,
 have assumed in (5.9) that
the cubes are so small that w(^ may switch from summations to in-
tegrals without serious orror. By numerical integration of (5.9),
or from standard mathematical tables (Craber, private communica-
tion 1978), we find that
2 2
T(r) = 12.30e-1.46r /aE g/cm3	 (5.10)
is our "best guess" for the density distribution based on the
given data.
A plot of (5.10) appears in rig. 1 (refer to page 37), along
with the "optimum" density distribution given by Bullen (1975, p.
361), which presumbably gives the most plausible distribution on
the basis of all the known data. (Rietsch 1977 also compares his
curve to Bul.len's.) The two curves agree remarkably well, in view
of the fact that -the information theory density distribution makes
use of only two basic pieces of data: mass and moment of inertia.
No seismic or free oscillation data have been included in our
information.
16
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6. DISCUSSION
6.1 COMPARISON WITH RIETSCH (1977)
My analysis differs from that of Rietsch (1977) at several
points. Rietsch (1977) begins with Jaynes's (1968) proposed
generalization of Shannon's (1948) information measure (4.1) for
continuous distributions
MI = -f
 P(P) log [ p (P) /W( p )] dv	
(6.1)
where p(p) is the probability distribution, pis the density dis-
tribution, and dv is the volume element for the parameter space.
The w(p) appearing in (6.1) is the prior probability distribution
which obtains when no information is known. Equation (6.1) differs
from Shannon's (1948) own proposed measure for continuous distri-
butions in that w(p) does not appear. I will argue in the follow-
ing paragraphs that Shannon's equation is a more useful measure
than Jaynes's for continuous distributions, However, the distinc-
tion is academic in this case since Rietsch (1977) chooses a con-
stant prior distribution w(p), which for all practical purposes
makes the two measures the same.
Rietsch (1977) then takes advantage of the spherical symmetry
of the problem and divides up the earth with spherical shells,
with the shell radii chosen so that all of the volumes between the
shells are equal. Later he lets the number of shells approach
infinity to obtain a continuous density distribution. I chose
cubes instead of shells to lay the groundwork for the general case
where there is no spherical symmetry; in particular, for finding
17
the density distribution which uses the known spherical harmonic
coefficients of the geopotential as constraints (as explained
in Section 6.5). So far the differences between approaches
are minor.
The last difference of note between Rietsch's (1977) trcat-
ment and my own is the one which produces the differing equations
for the density distribution. Rietsch (1977) chooses to fill the
earth's volume elements with continually varying masses, rather
than discrete particles. It is as though his volume elements
may be filled with a continuous liquid of any amount, rather than
with discrete mass-points as in my own. This leads him to a den-
sity distribution of the form (Rietsch 1977, p. 503)
_	 1
A ( r ) _
^l + X 2 r 2
and from doing integrals instead of summations. His distribution
has the same qualitative behavior as my own (5.10) and looks very
much the same when plotted, but obviously the functional form is
different. I chose to use discrete particles, since this is more
in keeping with what we know about atoms, and because it more
closely follows the traditional statistical mechanical development.
I should also mention that Rietsch (1977) investigated a more
general distribution by putting limits on the highest and lowest
density allowed in each volume element, instead of letting it
vary between zero and infinity.
d
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6.2 FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ASSUMPTIONS
A natural question to ask at this point is: how well do our
assumptions reelect the real earth? For instance, what about
using particles of equal mass? Where do atoms and molecules fit
in? The answer to the last question is: they don't, at this
stag;. We chose this simplified model to obtain a tractable
problem and illustrate the method; these are merely the first
steps. If pressed upon this point, we can take our "particle" to
be a proton+neutron+electron. The reason for choosing this com-
bination is that the earth is made up predominately of elements
with low atomic number. The nuclei of such elements very nearly
have equal numbers of protons and neutrons. (In the heavy elements,
neutrons significantly outnumber protons.) Also, electrical
neutrality prevails, so that for every proton there is an electron.
Hence we may think of the proton+neutron-i•electron as a naturally
occurring unit from which the earth is made. We can then pretend
that these "particles" are spread throughout the earth, and claim
to know nothing of atoms, molecules, chemical bonding, etc., which
would constitute further information. This line of argument also
takes care of any further objection to choosing indistinguishable
particles, since the previously mentioned elementary particles are
indistinguishable in the fundamental sense. However, this is going
to extremes.
The assumption that the cubes are sparsely occupied, thus
giving Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, may also be objectionable
from an operational standpoint. After all, volumes actually
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measured contain hugh numbers of particles. Relaxing this condi-
tion means that we are back to Bose-Einstein statisitcs and (5.7)
gives the average number of particles in a given cube. The den-
sity is then
M
P ( r ) _
(6.2)
e
al -a2r^ - 1 
With this approach we have a problem, because there are more un-
knowns than constraints. If we knew how to choose m/V, then we
could find a l
 and ap from the constraints of mass and moment of
inertia, as we did before. Unfortunate!-y, we have no clear guid-
ance in this matter.. Even if we choose m to be the mass of our
"particle", we would still have to find V.
There is a way, however, to neatly sidestep the problem. We
introduce a third piece of information: we assume we know p(aE),
the value of the density at the earth's surface. Using this in-
formation zc t6.2) yields
2
_  a
(e ela2aE -1)P(aE)	
(6.3)
A Fr) =
	 2
-alea2r
e e
	 -1
and we use our knowledge of a, and a2 to find the two multipliers.
I will not carry through the calculation, since according to
Stacey (1969, p. 104) the surface density of rocks is 2.84 g/cm3.
Our Maxwell-Boltzmann equation (5.10) already gives a surface
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density of 2.86 g/cm3 , so that (5.8) and (6.3) differ only triv-
ially.
We can therefore use Bose-Einstein statistics in the informa-
tion theory approach to the density distribution; but while more
general than Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics, it is more complicated
mathematically, as a comparison of (5.8) and (6.3) shows. The
Maxwell-Boltzmann case should probably be investigated first in
future developments, being simpler.
6.3 INFORMATION MEASURE FOR CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTIONS
Shannon (1948, p. 628) proposed as the appropriate general-
izat.. , -, of (4.1) for continuous distributions the function
MI = -IK !°° p(x)1np,(x)dx	 (6.4)
where p(x) is the probability distribution and x is a continuous
parameter. I will confine the discussion to the one dimensional
case without loss of generality.
There are three basic objections to (6.4) being the appro-
priate measure (Jaynes 1963, 1968; Hobson and Cheng 1973) which
are, in order of increasing seriousness,: (a) It is dimensionally
incorrect; (b) an infinity is thrown away in deriving it; and (c)
the form of the prior probability distribution is not invariant
under a change of variables. To corm , t these difficulties,
Hobson and Cheng (1973) and Jaynes (1963, 1968) propose using the
Kullback measure in its place, of which Jaynes's equation (6.1)
is but a special case. However, Tribus and Rossi (1973) and Batty
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(1974) argue that Shannon's original equation (6.4) is the appro-
priate measure.
While Rietsch (1977) follows Jaynes (1963, 1968) and Hobson
and Cheng (1973), I follow Tribus and Rossi (1973) and Batty
(1974), and will outline my reasons for doing so.
The problem of point (a) is the following. Suppose p(x) dx
represents the probability of finding a particle in an interval
dx near speed x. Then dx has dimensions cm/s and p(x) has dimen-
sions s/cm, so that the product of the two p(x) dx is dimension-
less. But the logarithm of p(x) is taken in (6.4), and this is
not allowed for dimensional quantities. So (6.4) cannot be di-
mensionally correct.
The problem is easily remedied. As we shall see below when
point (b) is discussed, the difficulty develops when p(x) is sep-
arated from dx. 11' we introduce a constant of value 1 and dimen-
sions of x, then we can write
P (x) dx = [ Dp (x) ] LN
where D is the constant. Each expression in brackets on the right
side of the equation above is now dimensionless, and we can now
separate p(x) from dx without falling into error with the loga-
rithm. Since D has value= 1, we can suppress it, its presence
being understood. We will ticsiume this has been done in our dis-
cussion in the following; parng i aphs .
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4As for point (b), in the continuous case P i goes over to
p(x) dx and (4.1) becomes:
lim S - F p(xi )dx log Ip(xi)dxl`dx— 0 l	 i	 JJ ))
_ - fp (x) log [ p (x)] dx - f p (x) log (dx) dx
where K has been set equal to 1. Obviously as dx-0, log(dx)--w
and the right side approaches infinity. At this point the log(dx)
term is subtracted off, leaving a well-behaved function which is
just (6.4). However, subtracting infinity from ?.nfinity and
obtaining a finite number is usually unsound mathematically.
This can be taken care of by going back to (4.1) and writing
it in exponential form
e-MI - II PPi
i i
Then in the continuous case it goes over to
e-MI1= i LP (x i ) dx] P (xi ) dx
which can be written
e MI1= II P(xi) p(xi )dx	 (xi)dx] 	 P(Xi)P(xl)dxJ[dxp 	 [dx]C1C
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by noting that
n dxp (xi ) dx = dxEp (xi ) dx = dx1i
When more information becomes available the probability distribu-
tion p(x) goes over to some new one q(x), whose associated measure
is
e-M12 = IIq (x ) dx
i q (xi )	 i	 [dxl
Dividing one by the ether and letting dx approach 0 gives
MI2
	
lim
	 f^I P (xi) P (xi ) dxl dxe	 Jdx 0
eM2 1	 q(x.)q(xi)dx	 dxa.	
i
The dx's cancel, giving
I.1I 2
log e	 = MI  - MI  = -( q (x) log q (x) dx +f p(x)log  p (x) dx
eM21	 1
which is well behaved. So we may as well write (6.4) as the MI
for continuous distributions, since we know now that the infinity
associated with the old distribution is the same as for the new
distribution, and subtraction of the two leads to no difficulties.
We are therefore concerned with chaiiges in the amount of infor-
mation, and not in the amount itself.
r'-
i
r
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The force of (c) may be seen from the following example.
Suppose once again that p(x)dx represents the probability of
finding a particle in the neighborhood dx near speed x, and further,
that the speed is definitely known to lie between values xl and x2.
We have no further information. If we apply Ja.ynes's principle
of minimum prejudice, we find
a - f p (x) log p (x) dx + a f p ( x) dx ] _ 0
a 
so that
-log p (x) - 1+ a= 0; p (x) = e
-1+ a
= 	
1
X2 - xl
so that p(x) is a constant for xl < x <x2 and zero outside the in-
terval. But the kinetic energy mx2 /2 (where m is the mass of the
particle) is a perfectly respectable physical quantity. Why not
take it as the continuous parameter? If we do so by setting
y = mx2/2 and apply Jaynes's principle once again we find:
d [- fs  (y) log s (y) dy + a f s (y) dy] - 0
8s
which implies
s (Y) =	 1	 for yl <- y :5 y2
Y2 - Y1
The two distributions are inconsistent: a constant distribution
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for speed implies a nonconstant distribution for energy and vice
versa, as may be seen from
s (y) dy = mx dx	 =	 2x dx	 p (x) dx2 ( x2 •- xi)	 ( x2 - xi)
Hence there is no one prior probability distribution. We can
make it what we please for any given parameter by a suitable
change of variables. To escape this difficulty, Jaynes (1968)
proposes to find the prior distribution w(p) in (6.1) via the
theory of groups. This matter is also discussed by Rietsch (1977,
pp. 494--495) and by Rowlinson (1970).
I must agree with Tri'bzs and Rossi (1973) that there really
is no problem; for to change variables is to ask a different
q uestion. However, I am not entirely certain that their reasons
nor believing so are the same as mine, due to the terseness of
their discussion. Therefore I will give my reasons below.
Let us start by recalling the meaning of (4.1). It is the
amount of information needed to single out the correct answer
from N possible answers. Now as P i goes over to p(x) dx in the
continuous case, the interpretation of (6.4) must be that it
determines the amount of information needed to trap the correct
answer in any one of the small intervals dx. Likewise, if we had
chosen some other variable y = f(x) as the continuous parameter,
then MI answers the question of how much information is needed
to trap the answer in any one of the intervals dy. So when we
pick x or y as the parameter, we are asking different questions
li;
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Mabout the problem. There is no one prior distribution. The
amount of information needed to answer a question is a function
of the question asked.
Let us clarify the situation with our example in which x is
speed and y is kinetic energy. Suppose that the mass of the
particle is 2 g and the speed is definitely known to lie between
0 and 100 cm/s. Take dx to be 1 cm. The energy obviously lies
between 0 and 104
 ergs. Take dy to be 1 erg when y is the prior
variable.
Now to use x or to use y as the parameter is to ask two dif-
ferent questions. Trapping the particle speed to within 1 cm/s
is not the same as trapping it to within 1 erg. If x is near 50
cm/s for example, then dy 2x dx and trapping the speed to within
1 cm/s means we know the energy to within -2-50-1 = 100 ergs, and
not 1 erg. So it is a question of resolution. Equal resolution
along the speed axis implies unequal resolution along the energy
axis and vice versa. Hence it is meaningless to ask, what is the
prior probability distribution? That depends on the question
you are asking.
This argument is bolstered by noting an unsatisfactory as-
pect of (6.1) pointed out by Tribus and Rossi (1973): the infor-
mation needed to single out the correct answer depends on the
order in which the information is given. That it not depend on
the order given is an essential part of deriving (4.1) (Baierlein
1971, pp. 64-74), and Shannon's (1948) equation is true to this
condition (Tribus and Rossi 1973) when generalized to continuous
distributions.
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Theories are neither right nor wrong; they have only varying
degrees of usefulness (Tribus 1966, p. 207). What I am suggesting
here is that Shannon's (1948) original equation (6.4) is more use-
ful than Jaynes's (1968, 1968) alternative equation when talking
about information and continuous distributions.
6.4 CRITICISMS OI'' INFORMATION THEORY INFERENCE
Some criticisms of information theory inference which have
been raised will be briefly discussed here, starting with the
coin flip problem.
Rowlinson (1970) argues that information theory is unable to
deal with certain kinds of information. Suppose, for example,
that we flip a coin 100 times and it comes up heads 75 times.
Clearly we have some relevant information on whether the next
flip will be heads or a tails. Rowlinson (1970) claims that
information theory cannot handle this problem.
Tribus (1969), an ardent proponent of information theory
inference, would probably answer this challenge according to
the algorithm given on page 120 of his book: assign probabilities
according to Jaynes's principle, and then modify the probabilities
using Bayes's theorem when new information becomes available. In
the coin flip problem the original information would be that two
outcomes are possible, giving probability 1/2 to heads and tails.
The new information would be the 75 heads out of 100 flips. This
would be used in Bayes's theorem to give the new probabilities.
I will not pursue this problem further here.
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Another apparent drawback is that information theory infer-
ence at times gives "unphysical" answers. For instance, if we
omitted our knowledge of the moment of inertia in solving for
the density distribution, then we would obtain a constant density
all throughout the earth, as may be easily verified. This does
not seem reasonable; we feel that the density should certainly
increase towards the center of the planet. The value of infor-
mation theory inference appears questionable in this instance.
The problem is easily resolved, as may be seen in the fol-
lowing example. Suppose that instead of guessing the earth's
density distribution we were confronted with a small object of
exotic shape and unknown composition and asked to guess its den-
sity distribution on the basis of known mass and volume. In this
case a constant density distribution does not appear at all un-
reasonable; this is because we are in a state of extreme ignorance
about the object. With the earth, however, this is not the case:
we have some ideas about how the earth ought to behave. In this
instance it is that gravity should pull the heavier material
towards the center of the earth, and high interior pressures will
compress it, making the density increase towards the center.
Hence we are dealing with tacit information. We can hardly with-
hold information from the method and then criticize it for not
reproducing what we did not tell it! So if an answer appears
"unphysical", then we have not been fair to the method; we did
not tell it everything we knew.
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46.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE THEORY
The results obtained above may be easily generalized to in-
elude any known volume integrals of the density distribution.
Supposing that there are L such integrals having the form
	
fp(r) fi
 (r) dv = F i
	(i = 1, ... L)
volume
of earth
the resulting average density distribution is
p(rj= const • exp(a lfl(r) +a2 f 2 (r) +...+aLfL(r) )	 (6.5)
The Lagrange multipliers a i
 are to be found from the known values
Fi . Note that the above result is not restricted to the spheri-
cally symmetric case. Besides the mass and moment of inertia,
the spherical harmonic coefficients Cp m and Sp m of the earth's
gravitational field immediately come to mind as integrals having
this form. I intend to publish the resulting p(r) based on the
gravity field coefficients in the near future.
The next obvious extension of the theory is to assume that
the earth is an elastic body so as to include the elastic param-
eters µ(r) and x(r) in addition to the density distribution p(r)
as unknown quantities to estimate. This will allow seismic travel
times, free oscillation periods, and body tide observations to be
	
used, all of which depend upon µ(r),
	 r) and p(r). Graber (1977)
has already made a start in this direction using mass, moment of
inertia, and three zero-node torsional normal modes of degree
= 2, 8, and 26 of the earth. More realistic treatment of atoms
and molecules has already been mentioned. Information theory
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rinference should be compared to other inverse techniques, such
as the Backus-Gilbert method. Gull and Daniell (1978) briefly
discuss the two methods. The goal of information theory inference
is .-o put in all of the physics and data we know about the earth
and maximize the remaining missing information.
Since there will never come a day when we have all of the
information, solid earth geophysics will always have a need for
sound methods of inference. Information theory is such a method.
Its philosophical basis is satisfying: no unwarranted weighting
of possible answers. It is rational and objective: Everyone
using it will obtain the same answers, given the same data (once
the formulation of the problem is agreed upon!); it gives the
"bast" answer on the basis of very little data; it provides an
alternative to extensive modeling; and its mathematics is
standard—that of statistical mechanics. Information theory
inference should find extensive use in solid earth geophysics.
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Figure 1. The information theory density distribution using
Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics (curve A) and the optimum density
distribution of Bullen (1975) (curve B) are shown as a function
of radial distance r.
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